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Abstract
This paper proves in a New Keynesian model that interest rate
pegging can explain the unusual business cycle fluctuations in China.
It is traditional wisdom that when the nominal interest rate is inflex-
ible, there is no unique equilibrium in macroeconomic models. We
prove that a unique equilibrium exists if the nominal rate is pegged
for a limited period, after which it switches to a flexible rate regime.
The peg alters the propagation of external shocks, magnifies volatil-
ity of endogenous variables, and leads to instability of the economy.
Besides, the model becomes more unstable when the peg duration
extends, and when the pegged rate deviates from steady state. At
the same time, fiscal multiplier increases under the peg, indicating fis-
cal policy may be more effective in mitigating economic fluctuations
when monetary policy is restricted by interest rate pegging.
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1. Introduction
As the world’s two largest economies, China and the United States are quite
different in their business cycle fluctuations. Figure 1 shows that in most years,
especially before 2000, the volatility of inflation is much larger in China than in
the U.S. In terms of output fluctuation, it is also significantly larger in China.
From 1987 to 2007, the standard deviations of annual and (seasonally adjusted)
quarterly GDP growth rates in China are 2.8 and 2.2, compared with 1.8 and 1.2
in the U.S. during the same period.
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Figure 1: Inflation in China v.s. U.S.
Sources: CPI data in China come from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS); CPI data in U.S. come from
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Notes: Since the NBS does not publish seasonally adjusted data of CPI, we use year-on-year growth rates of
monthly CPI To remove seasonal factors.
Figure 2 reveals the reason for this difference: the nominal rate in the U.S.
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is volatile, whereas that in China is relatively stable. Before the global financial
crisis of 2007, the nominal rate in the U.S. generally co-moves with inflation,
roughly conforming to the Taylor rule which guarantees the economic stability.
In contrast, inflation in China changes drastically compared with the nominal
rate, making the real rate move oppositely with inflation, hence the mirror-image
relation between the real rate and output growth in Figure 3a. When GDP grows
fast, the real rate decreases to make it grow faster; when GDP growth slows
down, the real rate increases to the effect of aggravating recession and deflation.
Therefore, the interest rate peg in Figure 2a brings about a positive feedback
mechanism in Figure 3a which increases the volatility of the Chinese economy.
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Figure 2: Nominal Rate and Inflation
Sources: One-year deposit rates in China are from the People’s Bank of China (PBoC); one-year treasury bill
rates in U.S. are retrieved from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Figure 3b compares the real rate and output growth in the US. The two series
generally co-move during the sample period except move oppositely between 2008
and 2015, when the nominal rate was pushed to the zero lower bound (ZLB) by
the depressionary demand shock. The correlation between YoY output growth
and the real interest rate in the U.S. changes from 0.1 (1987 − 2008) to −0.56
(2009 − 2015), roughly comparable to 0.54 (1993 − 2015) in China before the
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interest rate liberalization. Correspondingly, the standard deviation of the YoY
growth rate in quarterly GDP increases from 1.55 (1987− 2008) to 1.94 (2009−
2015), which reflects the magnifying effect of the interest rate peg.
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Figure 3: Real Rate and Output Growth
Sources: GDP data in China come from the NBS; GDP data in U.S. come from U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
Notes: The (realized) real interest rate is constructed as the one-year nominal rate minus the YoY growth rate
of CPI during the same period.
Both in China and the U.S., interest rate pegging leads to the negative relation
between inflation and the real rate, which is the main cause of macroeconomic
instability. In the U.S., when the nominal rate was pegged at the zero level from
2009 to 2015, conventional monetary policy lost its effects; the government relied
on quantitative ease and fiscal expansion to stimulate the economy and stop defla-
tion. In China, bank retail interest rates have been controlled by the government
since the era of the planned economy; the Chinese government implements a va-
riety of policy tools, such as direct control over loans and corporate investment,
regulation over land use, environmental protection, industrial policies, but takes
the benchmark deposit and lending rates as a last resort in its tool kit.
Recent years have seen an acceleration in financial reform: The interest rate
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liberalization in 2015 removed the ceilings and floors of retail interest rates.1
Meanwhile, direct finance grows rapidly and a partially-regulated shadow bank-
ing system emerges. However, the banking sector still dominates the financial
system, and commercial banks are restricted in adjusting retail rates. The PBoC
remains a deparment of the government and does not enjoy the same independence
as its western counterpart. One-year benchmark rates on deposits and loans, re-
ferred to as the “ballast stone” of China’s interest rate system, stay unchanged
from October 2015 until March 2019. The financial market is characterized as a
dual-track system, composed of saving deposits and loans whose prices are admin-
istratively controlled, and the markets of currency, bond, and stock where asset
prices have been liberalized. This is why the dual-track interest rate reform was
launched in 2018, a new round of market-oriented reform which aims to integrate
the two tracks of interest rates: regulated and market-determined interest rates.
The previous analysis establishes the following stylized facts of the Chinese
business cycle: (1) Inflation and output fluctuate violently, especially before the
year 2000; (2) The real interest rate moves in the opposite direction of inflation and
output. We take the peg of the nominal interest rate as the primary explanation of
these facts. But it is a challenge to study interest rate pegging in macroeconomic
models, in which the interest rate is determined by market supply and demand.
Traditional models (such as IS-LM) show that when the nominal rate is fixed
exogenously, the economy enters a divergent process and no equilibrium exists.
While in modern rational expectations models, multiple equilibria exist when the
nominal rate is constant.
Our paper instead proves that when the duration of the interest rate peg is
limited, a unique equilibrium exists in a rational expectation model. We then
examine the properties of the model and prove that the peg magnifies shock
1See Liu et al. (2020) for the analysis on the effects of interest rate liberalization in China.
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propagation and leads to economic instability. We also show that fiscal policy
can mitigate the excessive fluctuation caused by interest rate pegging. This paper
is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the
model, and section 4 proves the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. In
section 5, we carry out dynamic analyses and discuss model properties. In section
6, we calculate government expenditure multipliers and investigate the stabilizing
effects of fiscal policy. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
It has been known since Sargent & Wallace (1975) that exogenous interest
rate rules, including the interest rate peg as a special case, lead to indeterminacy
of equilibrium price level. Subsequent literature on rational expectations models
accordingly adopts a money growth rule, in which the nominal interest rate is
endogenously determined. Examples include Lucas (1983), Chari et al. (2000),
Christiano et al. (2003), Christiano et al. (2005), etc.
On the other hand, McCallum (1981) argues that prices can be determinate
for interest rate rules that involve feedback from model variables to the nominal
rate. Consequently, the New Keynesian literature emerging in the 1990s usually
assumes an interest rate feedback rule proposed by Taylor (1993): The central
bank adjusts the nominal rate based on the change of inflation and output. When
the nominal rate moves more than one-for-one to inflation (the Taylor Principle),
a unique equilibrium is guaranteed in the model.
There is also a debate over the monetary policy rule in China. On one hand,
Xie & Luo (2002) asserts that China’s monetary policy can be identified as an
interest rate rule. Zhang (2009), Li & Liu (2017) prove that the interest rate rule
is more effective in controlling inflation in China based on simulations in DSGE
models. On the other hand, Taylor (2000) proposes money supply as a more
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reasonable instrument in policy rules for emerging countries. Chen et al. (2016)
estimate a money growth rule for the Chinese economy that can be integrated
into DSGE and SVAR models. However, both money growth and the interest
rate rule imply a flexible interest rate. Although interest rate flexibility improves
in China during recent years, the interest rate peg before the interest rate reform
and its resulting economic instability should be separately modelled. Specifically,
since the data in the estimation of Chinese DSGE models are often traced to the
1990s, ignoring interest rate pegging necessarily leads to model mis-specification
and hence systematic errors in parameters.
The contribution of this paper is that we embed the interest rate peg of China
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. To avoid the pathol-
ogy of equilibrium, we follow a strategy of the recent ZLB literature, such as
Krugman (1998), Eggertsson & Woodford (2003), Carlstrom et al. (2014), and
Del Negro et al. (2015). The nominal interest rate is exogenously pegged, but
only for a limited period, after which it switches to a flexible rate regime. This
assumption guarantees the uniqueness of equilibrium in a rational expectations
model. We differ from the ZLB literature in that the pegged value of the nominal
rate is not necessarily zero, but can be any nonnegative value; and the nominal
rate is not pushed by a depressionary shock, but subject to monetary news shocks,
which offset the impact of other shocks on the nominal rate to maintain it at the
fixed value. This approach is similar to Blake (2012), Laseen & Svensson (2011),
and Gali (2009, 2011). But these authors focus on conditional forecasts of DSGE
models, whereas we mainly concern how the peg changes the property and the
propagation channel of the model.
As a substitution for traditional monetary policy, fiscal policy has been widely
discussed in the ZLB literature. A partial list includes Eggertsson (2006, 2010),
Cogan et al. (2010), Christiano et al. (2011), Woodford (2011), Drautzburg &
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Uhlig (2015), Dupor & Li (2015). Our paper complements their results, but with
special application to the Chinese economy.
3. The Model
3.1. Households
The basic structure of the model is similar to Clarida et al. (1999) and Wood-
ford (2003). The utility function of the representative household is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
logCt − e
τt
Nt
1+γ
1 + γ
+
Gt
1−χ
1− χ
]
(1)
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator, β is the subjective discount
rate, Ct, Nt, and Gt are household consumption, labor supply, and unproductive
government spending. Parameters γ, χ are respectively the elasticity coefficients
related to labor supply and government consumption, and τt represents a shock
on labor supply, satisfying τt = ρττt−1 + ετt , with 0 < ρτ < 1 and ετt ∼ N(0, σ2τ ).
The intertemporal budget constraint is given by
PtCt +Bt ≤ Bt−1Rt−1 +WtNt + Tt (2)
Here, Pt is price, Wt denotes nominal wage, Bt is the quantity of bonds purchased
by households in period t and maturing in the next period, Rt is the one-period
nominal rate of interest that pays off in period t, and Tt denotes a lump sum tax
(transfer) from the government.
The representative household maximizes its utility function (1) subject to the
budget constraint (2) and the non-Ponzi condition
E0 lim
t→∞
Bt+1
(1 +R0) (1 + R1) · · · (1 +Rt)
≥ 0
The equilibrium conditions associated with households are derived in Appendix
A.
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3.2. Firms
The final product (Yt) is aggregated by a continuum of intermediary goods
(Yt(i)):
Yt =
 1∫
0
Yt(i)
ε−1
ε di

ε
ε−1
(3)
where i ∈ (0, 1), and ε > 1 is the substitution elasticity between intermediary
goods. The final good producer maximizes its profit subject to equation (3):
maxP
 1∫
0
Yt(i)
ε−1
ε di

ε
ε−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di (4)
which yields:
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
−ε
Yt (5)
Equation (5) is the demand curve faced by intermediary goods producers. Sub-
stituting it into the zero profit condition of final good producers, we obtain the
relationship between the prices of the final product and intermediary goods:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−εdi
] 1
1−ε (6)
Differentiated intermediary goods are produced using the following technology:
Yt(i) = e
atNt(i) (7)
where at is a technology shock satisfying ∆at = ρa∆at−1 + εat with 0 < ρτ < 1
and εat ∼ N(0, σ2a). The marginal cost of the monopolistic producer is
st = (1− v)
Wt
eatPt
(8)
Here, v = 1/ε denotes the employment subsidy financed by lump sum taxes, to
correct the markup distortion at steady state.
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We adopt a variant of Calvo sticky prices. In each period t, a fraction of
intermediate goods producers, 1 − θ, can reoptimize their prices. The ith firm
that reoptimizes maxmizes the present discounted value of its future profits:
Et
∞∑
j=0
µt+jβ
t+j [Pt+j(i)Yt+j(i)− (1− v)Wt+kNt+k(i)] (9)
where µt+j is the multiplier on firm profits in the household’s budget constraint.
3.3. Aggregate Constraints
The resource constraint is
Yt = Ct +Gt (10)
Government consumption evolves according to
Gt = G
ρg
t−1e
εgt (11)
Here, G is the steady state level of government consumption, 0 < ρg < 1, and
εgt ∼ N(0, σ
2
g). Government consumption is financed by lump sum taxes, so that
Ricardian equivalence holds and the details of tax policy are irrelevant. After
taking logarithm, equation (11) transforms to gt = ρggt−1 + εgt .
Monetary policy follows the rule:
Rt =
 Zt, t > kd¯, t = 1, ..., k (12)
Here, Zt = R(pitpi )φpi(YtY )φyeεrt , with φpi > 1, 0 < φpi < 1, and εrt ∼ N(0, σ2r). The
variables R,Y,pi are respectively the steady state values of the nominal interest
rate, output, and inflation. Parameter k represents the duration of the interest
rate peg, which measures the flexibility of monetary policy. In periods t = 1, . . . , k,
the government sets the interest rate at its level of t = 0(d¯). When t > k, monetary
policy switches to a flexible interest rate (Zt), which is determined by the Taylor
rule. This assumption—the peg lasts only a limited period, and then turns to a
flexible interest rate—guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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4. Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
After log-linearization, the equilibrium conditions of the above model become
(see Appendix A for details)
ĉt = Etĉt+1 −
(̂
it − Etpit+1
) (13)
pit = βpit+1+
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
{[1 + γ(1− Sg)] ĉt + τ̂t − (1 + γ)ât + γSgĝt} (14)
ît =
 0, t = 1, ..., kφpipit + φyŷt + εrt , t > k (15)
where Sg denotes the fraction of government consumption in output at steady
state. Equation (13) is the dynamic IS curve, equation (14) is the New Keynesian
Philips curve. Monetary policy is represented by the change of the nominal rate
in equation (15), which affects the real rate in equation (13) and thus determines
the properties of the model. For example, the increase of inflation raises the real
rate if the nominal rate follows the Taylor rule, while decreases the real rate if the
nominal rate is pegged.
Substituting out for ît in equation (13), we obtain a system of difference equa-
tions of pit and ĉt. Given that both variables are non-predetermined, the solution
to the system is locally unique, if and only if, both eigenvalues of the coefficient
matrix fall in the unit circle (Blanchard & Kahn, 1980).
4.1. Multiple Equilibria Under the Peg of Infinite Horizon
From the monetary policy rule (15), we have ît = 0 under the interest rate
peg. Substituting it into (13), we get
ĉt = Etpit+1 + Etĉt+1 (16)
(14) can be simplified to
pit = βpit+1 + ηĉt + X̂t (17)
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where λ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
, η = λ [1 + γ(1− Sg)], and X̂t = λ (τ̂t − (1 + γ)ât + γSgĝt).
(16) and (17) form the following system of difference equations: ĉt
pit
 = A1
 Et (ĉt+1)
Et (pit+1)
+
 0
X̂t
 (18)
where A1 =
 1 1
η η + β
.
The above system corresponds to the case of the infinite period peg. Since ĉt
and pit are both non-predetermined variables, the sufficient and necessary condi-
tion for the existence and uniqueness of (18) is the number of eigenvalues of A1
within the unit circle equals 2 (the number of non-predetermined variables). On
the contrary, if the number of eigenvalues in the unit circle is less than that of
non-predetermined variables, multiple solutions exist.
Proposition 1: Let λ1, λ2 be eigenvalues of matrix A1. The condition −1 <
λ1, λ2 < 1 is not satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix B.
So multiple solutions exist in the system (18).
4.2. Unique Equilibrium Under the Peg of Finite Periods
A peg of finite periods implies that the nominal rate exits the peg after period
k, and then turns to a flexible rate from period t = k + 1. For simplicity, assume
the response coefficient φy = 0.
First, we prove that a unique equilibrium exists in the case of a flexible interest
rate. Substituting ît = φpipit + εrt into (13) and (14), after rearranging terms, ĉt
pit
 = A2
 Et (ĉt+1)
Et (pit+1)
− 1
1 + φpiη
 εrt+φpiX̂t
ηεrt − X̂t
 (19)
where A2 = 11+φpiη
 1 1− φpiβ
η η + β
. The solution to the difference equations is
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locally unique if and only if the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix are both in
the unit circle.
Proposition 2: Let λ1, λ2 be the eigenvalues of matrix A2. Then λ1 and λ2
are real numbers and satisfy −1 < λ1, λ2 < 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus we proved that unique solution exists in the flexible rate system of (19).
Equation (19) can be simplified as Ẑt = A2EtẐt+1 + V̂t, where Ẑt =
 ĉt
pit
,
V̂t = −
1
1+φpiη
 εrt+φpiX̂t
ηεrt − X̂t
. Using the method of undetermined coefficients, it is
easy to find the solution to the flexible rate model after period k: Ẑt = aẐt−1+bV̂t.
In this way, we obtain the unique solution to the model when t > k + 1.
Second, we derive the solution for periods t < k + 1 by backward deduction.
We take the solution of t = k + 1 as the terminal condition and solve the model
backward. For example, in period t = k, the equilibrium condition (18) can be
simplified as Ẑk = A1EkẐk+1 + Ûk. Substituting the obtained solution Ẑk+1 =
aẐk+bV̂k+1 into it, we have Ẑk = A1Ek
(
aẐk + bV̂k+1
)
+Ûk=A1aẐk+A1bEkV̂k+1+
Ûk, that is, Ẑk = [I − A1a]−1
(
A1bEkV̂k+1 + Ûk
).
Likewise, in period t = k − 1, the evolution equation under the interest rate
peg is Ẑk−1 = A1Ek−1Ẑk + Ûk−1. Substituting the obtained solution of Ẑk into it,
we get the solution of Ẑk−1. In the same manner, we can obtain the solutions of
t = 1, 2, . . . , k − 2.
Through the above steps, we obtain the unique equilibrium in the case of the
finite period peg.
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5. Dynamic Analysis
This section investigates the model property by simulation.2 Parameter val-
ues are those commonly used in the literature. The parameter measuring price
stickiness (θ) is 0.75, household discount rate (β) is 0.99, and the curvature of the
disutility of labor (γ) is 1. The proportion of government consumption to output
in steady state (Sg) is 0.1. The response coefficients of the nominal rate to infla-
tion (φpi) and output (φy) are 1.5 and 0. The autoregressive coefficient of external
shocks is 0.5; the standard deviation of the preference (ετt ) and technolog shock
(εat ) is 0.01; the standard deviation of fiscal policy (εgt ) and monetary policy shock
(εrt ) are 0.1 and 0.0025. Thus in our quarterly model, a one standard deviation
increase in the nominal interest rate amounts to a 1% increase in the annualized
rate.
5.1. Impulse Response Analysis
We first discuss the impulse response functions of model variables, to show how
the propagation of external shocks is affected by interest rate pegging. Assume
the economy is at steady state in period 0. In period t = 1, the economy is subject
to a one standard deviation shock. The nominal interest rate is pegged at steady
state during periods 1 to k and turns to a flexible rate from period k + 1.
5.1.1. Responses to a Preference Shock
The shock ετt shifts marginal disutility of labor, i.e., the (un)willingness of the
household providing labor supply. Figure 4 compares the reponses under a flexible
rate, a 4-period peg, and an 8-period peg.
A positive preference shock reduces the willingness to supply labor, so that
natural output (the output level of flexible prices) declines. The optimality condi-
2We thank Larry Christiano for providing the matlab codes of simulations.
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Figure 4: Responses to a Labor Preference Shock
Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses to a one S.D. increase in labor preference for different durations
of an interest rate peg.
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tion of the household requires that the marginal effects of labor and consumption
change simultaneously, which makes consumption decline. Since natural output
declines more than consumption demand, therefore inflation rises. And the out-
put gap (defined as the difference between output and the natural level of output)
also rises because it moves together with inflation.
The impact of interest rate pegging is reflected in the dynamic IS curve of
equation (13). Under a flexible rate, the Taylor rule means that the nominal rate
increases more than inflation, so that the real rate increases and thus restrains
the rise of inflation and the output gap. Because output is determined by natural
output and the output gap together, and natural output declines more than the
output gap rises, therefore the output level decreases. On the contrary, under a
pegged rate, the nominal rate remains unchanged, so the real rate increases and
thus leads to higher inflation and a wider output gap. The increase of the output
gap exceeds the decline in natural output, allowing output to increase rather than
to decrease.
Under a flexible interest rate, the real rate moves in the same direction of
inflation, producing a negative feedback mechanism to ensure economic stability.
In contrast, under an interest rate peg, the real rate moves in the opposite direction
of inflation, adding positive feedback to the transmission mechanism: The increase
of inflation and expected inflation leads to a decrease in the real rate, which further
increases inflation and expected inflation, thus decreasing the real rate even more
... The economy falls into a vicious circle and will eventually collapse. This is the
“accumulation process” analyzed by Wicksell and Friedman. But if the interest
rate peg lasts only a limited period, the expectation of switching to the flexible
rate will constrain this divergent process. When the peg ends, higher inflation
will lead to a higher nominal rate, which reduces inflation and output more. The
representative agent with rational expectations will weigh these two factors when
15
making decisions, and thus determine the optimal path of inflation and output.
And the same logic applies in the case of deflation.
The impulse response analysis shows that model variables are more sensitive
to external shocks under an interest rate peg, which enlarges the fluctuation of
inflation and the output gap. In general, the interest rate peg magnifies model
volatility and leads to instability of the economy. And the longer is the duration
of the peg, the more volatile is the economy.
5.1.2. Responses to a Technology Shock
The effects of a temporary technology shock are similar to those of the la-
bor preference shock, but in an opposite direction. So we focus on a permanent
technology shock below. The change of technology (∆at) follows a first-order
autoregressive process, meaning its level (at) is a unit root process. Thus a tech-
nology shock (εat ) brings about a permanent change of at. Figure 5 compares the
responses to a one standard deviation technology shock under a flexible rate, a
4-period pegged rate, and an 8-period peg.
A permanent increase in at leads to a permanent increase in output, so the
household increases its consumption due to a positive wealth effect. Since natural
output (production capacity) increases gradually with the technology level, it
cannot catch up with the increase of current consumption. Consequently, current
output exceeds natural output, leading to a positive output gap and inflation.
Under a flexible rate, the nominal rate increases more than inflation, thus
restraining the rise of the output gap. Since output is determined by the output
gap and natural output together, it gradually converges to the new steady state
with the increase of technology and natural output, after a one-off jump caused
by the output gap. In the case of the nominal rate peg, the real rate decreases to
magnify the jump of the output gap, causing output overshoots its final steady
state. In this case, the change of output is dominated by the output gap. Both fall
16
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Figure 5: Responses to a Permanent Technology Shock
Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses to a one S.D. increase in technology growth rate for different
durations of an interest rate peg.
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gradually to steady state with the return of the real rate, though natural output
rises with the technology level.
The responses to a permanent shock confirm the previous conclusion drawn
from a temporary shock. The positive feedback from the interest rate peg mag-
nifies the change of inflation and the output gap, thus increasing model volatility
and leading to economic instability. Besides, the longer is the interest rate pegged,
the more unstable is the economy, and specifically, the more over-reactive is the
output level.
5.2. Simulation With all Shocks
The impulse response analysis above examines the properties of the model at
steady state. In the real world, nominal interest rates are generally pegged at
levels different from the steady state. Below we study this situation based on
simulations with all the four shocks hitting the model. Assume that before t = 0,
money policy follows the Taylor rule, and the economy fluctuates stochastically.
From period 1 to k, the central bank pegs the nominal rate at its level of period
0. After period k, moentary policy returns to the flexible rate, and the model
continue to fluctuate as before t = 0.
In Figure 6, we compare three scenarios when the nominal rate is pegged
above, below, and at the steady state. The left column shows that when the
interest rate is pegged above steady state, output and inflation fall below their
steady state levels. The model enters a spiral of depression and deflation until
the exit of the peg. The middle column shows the opposite situation of boom
and inflation. We can see the difference between initial pegged levels lead to
completely different paths of inflation and output. In both cases, the economy
will deviate from steady state further and further with the extension of the peg
duration, until it collapses in the infinite period. And the only constraint on this
divergent process is the expectation of monetary policy returning to the flexible
18
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Figure 6: Simulation When the Interest Rate is Pegged Above, Below, and at the Steady State
Notes: Inflation and the interest rate are expressed in annualized percentage points, output and the output gap
are the percent deviation from steady state.
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rate in the future.
In the right column, the nominal rate is pegged at its steady state level, and the
fluctuations of model variables are relatively mild with no tendency of divergence.
But this situation is rare, because the real world is far more complex. First, the
steady state of the economy may change. Once the pegged rate deviates from
its steady state value, it returns to the previous situations. Second, even if the
steady state of the nominal rate remains unchanged, it is difficult (if possible) for
the government to find this value.
The simulations in Figure 6 confirm previous results that interest rate pegging
magnifies economic volatility. And when nominal rates are pegged at different
levels, the paths of model variables can be drastically different. Comparing the
left and middle columns with the right column, we can also conclude that the
further the pegged rate deviates from the steady state, the more volatile is the
economy.
6. Fiscal Policy Under the Interest Rate Peg
A special case of interest rate pegging is the liquidity trap, when the nominal
interest rate is pushed to a very low level and cannot be further reduced. Keynes
(1936) studies this situation and asserts that monetary policy is invalid and fiscal
expansion is needed to pull the economy out of the depression. In our previous
analysis, monetary policy is restricted by interest rate pegging, so the only policy
tool (in the model) is government spending. We thus examine its effects in this
section.
6.1. Fiscal Multiplier
The fiscal multiplier is the ratio of the change in output (consumption) to the
change in government spending that causes it. It is often used to measure the
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effectiveness of fiscal policy. Below we calculate and compare the fiscal multipliers
under a flexible and a pegged rate.
First consider the limiting case when the nominal rate is pegged over an infi-
nite period. We close the other shocks (τ̂t = ât = 0 for all t), and keep only the
government spending shock. We then solve the model using the method of unde-
termined coefficients. Substituting ĉt = Acĝt, pit = Apiĝt into equations (13)–(14)
under the pegged rate, we can get the consumption multiplier under the infinitely
pegged rate:
Ac =
ρg
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
([(1− Sg)(1 + γ) + 1]Sg)
(1− ρg)(1− βρg)− ρgκ
(20)
It measures by how much consumption rises if government spending increases one
unit. Based on the previously calibrated parameter values, we have Ac > 0.
Following the same strategy, we can obtain the consumption multiplier under
the flexible rate (with φy = 0) by substituting ĉt = Bcĝt, pit = Bpiĝt into equations
(13)–(14):
Bc =
ρg
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
([(1− Sg)(1 + γ) + 1]Sg) (1− φpiβ)
(1− ρg + φpiκ) (1 + φpiκ− (κ+ β)ρg)− ρgκρg (1− φpiβ)
(21)
Based on the same parameter calibration, the numerator of Bc is smaller than
that of Ac due to φpiβ > 0, while the denominator of Bc is larger than that of Ac
due to φpiκ > 0. Thus we have Ac > Bc.
From ŷt = CY ĉt + GY ĝt = (1 − Sg)ĉt + Sgĝt, we have the output multiplier
dyt
dgt
= 1
Sg
ŷt
ĝt
= 1−Sg
Sg
ĉt
ĝt
+ 1. In our model, the nominal rate is pegged for a limited
period. Therefore, ĉt
ĝt
lies between Ac and Bc, which set the upper and lower
bounds for the consumption multiplier. Obviously, with the extension of the peg
duration, fiscal multiplier increases accordingly.
On the other hand, with the increase of φpi, Bc decreases. When φpi > 1/β, Bc
turns negative, meaning that fiscal expenditure crowds out private consumption.
Thus we come to the conclusion that the more flexible is the interest rate, and
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the larger is the response of the nominal rate, the smaller is the fiscal multiplier.
6.2. Responses to a Fiscal Policy Shock
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Figure 7: Responses to a Fiscal Policy Shock
Notes: This figure plots the impulse responses to a one S.D. increase in fiscal expenditure for different durations
of an interest rate peg.
Assume that at period t = 1 government spending is subject to a one standard
deviation shock (εgt ). Figure 7 compares the responses of model variables under a
flexible rate, a pegged rate of 4-periods, and an 8-period peg.
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A positive fiscal shock has two effects. On one hand, it expands demand.
Since monopolistically competitive firms are constrained by demand, government
spending expansion under sticky prices will lead to a simultaneous increase of
output, marginal cost, and inflation. On the other hand, under the assumption
of Ricardian equivalence, the tax increase accompanying fiscal expansion reduces
households’ lifetime income. Therefore, the household cuts its consumption on
goods and leisure, leading to the increase of labor supply.
Under a flexible interest rate, the real rate increases with the rise of inflation
and thus restrains consumption, reflecting the crowding-out effect of government
spending. But the increase of government spending exceeds the decrease of private
consumption, so the net effect is an increase of output. Quantitatively, a one
standard deviation shock means fiscal expenditure increases 10% relative to its
steady state value. The increase of output is only 0.45% in period t = 1, and the
calculated output multiplier is 0.45; while consumption is reduced by 0.61%, and
the corresponding consumption multiplier is −0.55.
Under a pegged rate, monetary policy does not respond to inflation or gov-
ernment spending. The real rate decreases with the increase of inflation and thus
stimulates current consumption demand, offsetting the negative wealth effect and
increasing output further. Dupor & Li (2015) term this interaction between in-
flation expectations and the real rate as the “expected inflation channel”. Quan-
titatively, under the 4-period peg, output increases by 1.65% and consumption
increases by 0.73% owing to a one standard deviation fiscal shock. The fiscal
expenditure multiplier rises to 1.65, and the consumption multiplier turns from
negative to 0.65. Under the interest rate peg, the crowding-out effect turns into
a crowding-in effect. Obviously, the longer is the duration of the peg, the larger
is the fiscal multiplier.
The conclusions here complement those in recent literature. The empirical
23
study of Hall et al. (2009) finds that the output multiplier ranges from 0.5 to
−1.0, and the consumption multiplier ranges from −0.5 to −0. Woodford (2011)
and Christiano et al. (2011) prove in DSGE models that when the economy is
at the zero lower bound, the fiscal expenditure multiplier reaches its maximum
without the offsetting effect of monetary policy. Overall, the basic conclusion is
that the size of the multiplier changes with monetary policy regimes and the state
of the economy. And the inflexibility of the nominal interest rate leads to a higher
fiscal multiplier.
6.3. Mitigating Fluctuations With Fiscal Policy
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Different from the shocks of technology and preference, fiscal expenditure is a
variable controlled by the government. When the economy is subject to exogenous
shocks, the government can counteract their effects and smooth out economic
fluctuations through fiscal policy. The size of the fiscal multiplier reflects to some
extent how effective the government can regulate the economy.
When the nominal rate is set higher than the steady state, inflation and output
fall below the steady state. Figure 8 shows the effects of fiscal expansion in this
situation. During the interest rate peg (periods t = 1 to 6), fiscal expenditure
increases by 10% relative to the steady state. In Figure 8, the drop of inflation
and output is mitigated.
We set the autocorrelation coefficient of fiscal expenditure to 0, so that it is
easy to compare the multipliers. When fiscal expansion extends longer than the
duration of the peg, the effects of fiscal expansion on output become smaller for
periods t = 6 to 12. The reason is that under the flexible rate, the increase of
inflation leads to an interest rate increase, which in turn depresses inflation and
output, and crowds out consumption. Thus the multiplier of fiscal expenditure
declines under the flexible rate. Christiano et al. (2011) also shows that when the
economy gets out of the liquidity trap and the nominal rate leaves the zero lower
bound, the effect of fiscal expansion will be greatly reduced.
Expansionary fiscal policy can be used by governments to stimulate the econ-
omy during a recession. For example, during 1998−2001, the central government
of China alleviated the recession and deflation by implementing active fiscal poli-
cies; the 4 trillion economic stimulus program at the end of 2008 also helps bring
China’s economy out of a sharp decline. By the same logic, contractionary fiscal
policy (e.g., a decrease in government spending or an increase in taxes) can be
used by governments to cool down an “overheating” economy.
Based on the above analysis, although economic fluctuation increases under the
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interest rate peg, the fiscal expenditure multiplier also increases. This means the
government can manage and regulate the economy more effectively, and assuage
economic fluctuations through fiscal policy.
7. Conclusion
The interest rate plays a key role in the macroeconomy. It is traditional
wisdom when the nominal interest rate is constant, there is no unique equilibrium
in macroeconomic models, including both IS-LM and modern rational expectation
models.
We prove in a textbook New Keynesian model that a unique equilibrium exists
when the nominal rate is pegged for a limited period, after which it switches
to a flexible rate regime. The main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
(1) Under the interest rate peg, model variables are more sensitive to external
shocks. This explains the large fluctuations of the Chinese economy. (2) Besides,
the model becomes more unstable when the peg duration extends, and when the
pegged rate deviates from steady state. (3) Under the peg, the size of government
spending multiplier increases, which means fiscal policy may be more effective in
mitigating economic fluctuations.
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Appendix A. Computing the Equilibrium
Appendix A.1. Households
The representative household maximizes its utility (equation (1) in the text)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (equation (2) in the text). We
obtain the following first-order conditions:
βEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Rt
pit+1
}
= 1 (A.1)
pit+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
(A.2)
eτtN
γ
t Ct
σ =
Wt
Pt
(A.3)
Appendix A.2. Firms
Appendix A.2.1. Optimal Price Setting
From equation (9) in the text, the representative intermediary good producer
chooses the optimal price P˜t to maximize the discounted sum of its future profits
when it can not reoptimize:
Et
∞∑
j=0
µt+jβ
jθj
[
P˜tYt+j(i)− Pt+jst+jYt+j(i)
]
Substituting out for Yt(i), we then have
Et
∞∑
j=0
µt+jβ
jθjYt+jP
ε
t+j
[
P˜t
1−ε
− Pt+jst+jP˜t
−ε
]
Taking its derivative with respect to P˜t yields the following optimality condition:
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjθj
Yt+j
Ct+j
(Xt,j)
−ε
[
p˜tXt,j −
ε
ε− 1
st+j
]
= 0
where p˜t is the real price, and Xt,j =
 1pit+jpit+j−1...pit+1 j ≥ 11 j = 0 .
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From the above condition we obtain
p˜t =
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjθj
Yt+j
Ct+j
(Xt,j)
−ε ε
ε−1
st+j
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjθj
Yt+j
Ct+j
(Xt,j)
1−ε
=
Kt
Ft
(A.4)
Here,
Kt =
Yt
Ct
ε
ε− 1
(1− v)
eτtNγt Ct
eat
+ βθEt
(
1
pit+1
)
−ε
Kt+1 (A.5)
Ft = Et
∞∑
j=0
(βθ)j
Yt+j
Ct+j
(Xt,j)
1−ε =
Yt
Ct
+ βθEt
(
1
pit+1
)1−ε
Ft+1 (A.6)
Appendix A.2.2. Aggregation
The aggregate price index is
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−εdi
] 1
1−ε
=
[
(1− θ)P˜ 1−εt +
∫
P 1−εi,t di
] 1
1−ε
=
[
(1− θ)P˜ 1−εt + θP
1−ε
t−1
] 1
1−ε
Dividing both sides by Pt yields p˜t =
[
1−θpit(ε−1)
1−θ
] 1
1−ε . Connecting it with (A.4),
we have
Kt
Ft
=
[
1− θpit
(ε−1)
1− θ
] 1
1−ε (A.7)
We follow the strategy of Yun (1996) to derive the relationship between aggre-
gate output (Yt) and aggregate labor (Nt). Define Y ∗t = ∫ 10 Yi,tdi = ∫ 10 AtNi,tdi =
AtNt. Substituting out for Yi,t using Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
−ε
Yt, we have
Y ∗t =
∫ 1
0
Yi,tdi = Yt
∫ 1
0
(
Pi,t
Pt
)
−ε
di = YtP
ε
t
∫ 1
0
(Pi,t)
−εdi = YtP
ε
t (P
∗
t )
−ε
Rearranging terms,
Yt =
(
P ∗t
P
)ε
Y ∗t = p
∗
tAtNt (A.8)
Here,
p∗t =
[
(1− θ)
(
1− θpiε−1t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
+
θpiεt
p∗t−1
]
−1
(A.9)
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which represents the distortion of efficiency and satisfies p∗t
 = 1 Pi,t = Pj,t≤ 1 otherwise .
Appendix A.2.3. Collecting the Equations
The above equations are listed as follows:
βEt
{
Ct
Ct+1
Rt
pit+1
}
= 1
pit+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
eτtNγt Ct =
Wt
Pt
Kt =
Yt
Ct
ε
ε− 1
(1− v)
eτtNγt Ct
eat
+ βθEtpit+1
εKt+1
Ft =
Yt
Ct
+ βθEtpit+1
(ε−1)Ft+1
Kt
Ft
=
[
1− θpit
(ε−1)
1− θ
] 1
1−ε
Yt = p
∗
tAtNt
p∗t =
[
(1− θ)
(
1− θpiε−1t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
+
θpiεt
p∗t−1
]
−1
Appendix A.2.4. Log-linearization
Assume the steady state inflation pi = 1. Solving for steady state variables
yields R = 1
β
− 1, p∗ = 1, and K = F = Y/C
1−βθ
. Linearizing the Euler equation
(A.1) around steady state yields
ĉt = −
[̂
it − Etpit+1
]
+ Etĉt+1 (A.10)
Linearizing the firm’s first-order conditions (A.5)–(A.7) around steady state yields
1
1− βθ
K̂t = τt + (1 + γ)n̂t +
βθ
1− βθ
Et
(
εpit+1 + K̂t+1
)
1
1− βθ
F̂t = ŷt − ĉt +
βθ
1− βθ
Et
(
(ε− 1)pit+1 + F̂t+1
)
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K̂t − F̂t =
θ
1− θ
pit
Eliminating K̂t and F̂t, we can obtain the New Keynesian Philips curve:
pit = βpit+1 + λ (τ̂t + (1 + γ)n̂t − ŷt + ĉt) (A.11)
where λ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
.
Evaluating the resource constraint Yt = Ct + Gt at steady state, we have
G/Y = Sg and C/Y = 1− Sg. Log-linearizing the resource constraint yields
ŷt = (1− Sg)ĉt + Sgĝt (A.12)
In steady state, price distortions are eliminated, hence log p∗t=0. Log-linearizing
(A.9), we get the law of motion for p∗t : p̂∗t ≈ θp̂∗t−1 + 0 × pit = θp̂∗t−1. Assume
p̂∗0 = 0, then p̂∗t = 0, which means P ∗t = Pt, i.e., p∗t = 1. Substituting it into (A.8),
we have Yt = AtNt around steady state. Log-linearizing it yields
ŷt = ât + n̂t (A.13)
Substituting (A.12) and (A.13) into (A.11),
pit = βpit+1 + λ {[1 + γ(1− Sg)] ĉt + τ̂t − (1 + γ)ât + γSgĝt} (A.14)
Log-linearizing monetary policy (equation (12) in the text) yields equation
(15) in the text, i.e.,
ît =
 φpipit + φyŷt + εrt , t > k,0, t = 1, · · · , k. (A.15)
Appendix A.2.5. Natural Output and Output Gap
Natural output is the level when price distortions are eliminated (p∗t = 1).
We have Nit = Nn, which is the (natural) employment level of flexible prices.
Log-linearizing (A.8) yields ŷnt = ât + n̂nt .
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From (A.3) and the equilibrium condition of the labor market under flexible
prices, eτt(Nnt )γCnt =At. Log-linearizing it yields ĉnt + γn̂nt + τ̂t = ât.
Substituting out for n̂nt and ĉnt yields natural output:
ŷnt =
(1− Sg)(1 + γ)ât − (1− Sg)τ̂t + Sgĝt
1 + (1− Sg)γ
(A.16)
Further, we can obtain the output gap:
y˜t = yt − y
n
t = ŷt − ŷ
n
t
= [1+(1−Sg)γ]ŷt−(1−Sg)(1+γ)ât+(1−Sg)τ̂t−Sg ĝt
1+(1−Sg)γ
(A.17)
Rewriting the dynamic IS curve (A.10) in terms of the output gap, we obtain:
y˜t = Ety˜t+1 − (1− Sg)
(̂
it − Etpit+1
)
+ Sg (ĝt − Etĝt+1)−
(
ŷnt − ŷ
n
t+1
) (A.18)
Rewriting the New Keynesian Philips curve (A.14) in terms of the output gap,
we obtain:
pit = βpit+1 + κy˜t (A.19)
where κ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
1+(1−Sg)γ
1−Sg
.
We can also rewrite (A.10) and (A.14) in terms of log-deviation of output from
its steady state, which yields
ŷt = Etŷt+1 − (1− Sg)
(̂
it − Etpit+1
)
+ Sg (ĝt − Etĝt+1) (A.20)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κŷt − κŷnt
= βEtpit+1 + κŷt − κψ
(
(1−Sg)(1+γ)
Sg
ât −
1−Sg
Sg
τ̂t − ĝt
) (A.21)
where ψ = Sg
1+(1−Sg)γ
.
Appendix B. Proofs
Appendix B.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The necessary condition of −1 < λ1, λ2 < 1 is
 λ1 + λ2 < 1 + λ1λ2|λ1λ2| < 1 . The
trace of matrix A1 satisfies tr(A1) = 1 + η + β = λ1 + λ2, and the determinant
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satisfies del(A1) = β = λ1λ2. The second inequality |λ1λ2| < 1 holds obviously.
The first inequality λ1 + λ2 < 1 + λ1λ2 holds if and only if η < 0. From the
calibration of model parameters, 0 < θ, β, Sg < 1, and γ > 0, we have η > 0. So
the first inequality λ1 + λ2 < 1 + λ1λ2 does not hold. QED.
Appendix B.2. Proof of Proposition 1
The characteristic polynomial of matrix A2 is λ2 − (1+η+β)(1+φpiη)λ + β = 0. For
this equation, the sufficient and necessary condition of −1 < λ1, λ2 < 1 is
∣∣∣1+η+β1+φpiη ∣∣∣ < 1 + β
|β| < 1
. The second inequality |β| < 1 holds obviously. The first
inequality transforms to 1 + η + β < 1 + β + φpiη + φpiηβ, i.e., φpi > 11+β , which
holds when the Taylor Principle is satisfied. Thus the first inequality holds. QED.
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